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Abstract
Optimal control theory is employed to characterize the socially optimal trajectory of the royalty per channel and the number of royalty-paying users of state-owned spectrum for broadcasting. The spectrum royalty is set by an omniscient public planner to maximize the sum of
the discounted consumers’ utilities over an infinite planning horizon. The number of broadcasters adjusts over time to profits, while the quality of the industry’s service is determined
by variety and reception. The trade-off between the benefits of greater variety and the costs of
intensified interferences associated with the number of broadcasters is central to the analysis.
The convergence of the socially optimal trajectory of the royalty per channel and the number
of broadcasters to a steady state and the comparative statics of the steady state are analyzed.
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This paper is based on UOW Economics Working Paper 12-10. It provides an improved and
more general analysis.
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This paper is based on UOW Economics Working Paper 12-10. It provides an improved and more general
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1. Introduction
Consumers’ satisfaction from over-the-air (OTA) broadcasts typically increases with the
broadcasts’ variety and the clarity of their reception. While an expansion of the number of
OTA broadcasters increases the variety of programs, the increased spectral congestion intensifies interferences thereby decreasing reception clarity. This variety-reception trade-off is the
focal theme of our theory of optimal pricing of the broadcasting spectrum, and is motivated
by the ensuing background description of OTA broadcasting industries in technologically advanced countries.
Due to the public good nature of OTA broadcasts and their educational, cultural and
political impacts, and because of scarce bandwidth and high sunk costs, entry and content
rules have long been tightly regulated in all major OECD countries (Steiner 1952; Webbink
1973; Spence and Owen 1977). Until the late 1970s the television broadcasting industries in
OECD countries comprised only a handful of licensed and highly protected public and commercial firms. Since 1980 alternative transmission techniques, such as satellite and cable,
have created a more favorable environment for entry into the television broadcasting industry. Yet opportunities for entry have been mainly taken up at local levels and the marketshares of nation-wide OTA television broadcasters have remained high (Motta and Polo,
1997; Caves, 2006).
Radio broadcasting industries, on the other hand, have been less concentrated and
more localized, but entry into these industries has also remained highly regulated due to sunk
costs and a tight spectrum constraint. In many European metropolitan areas, for example,
OTA radio broadcasts are provided by 20 to 80 FM stations and by similar numbers of AM
stations. Metropolitan areas in Italy offer the largest FM variety. With only fifty kHz separation between stations, their FM broadcasting spectrum is the most congested in Europe. The
European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations, a coordination

2

agency, recently re-emphasized the implications of this trade-off between content variety and
reception clarity (CEPT, 2010).2
The adoption of digital transmission technologies, which are spectrally efficient, has
expanded the scope for program variety in the television and radio broadcasting industries
(Adda and Ottaviani, 2005). For example, the adoption of digital technology by American
OTA broadcasters in 2007 and the subsequent turning off of analogue signals in 2008 have
freed significant UHF spectrum. Even so, these spectral gains have not relaxed the spectrum
constraint in the US television broadcasting industry, as the spectral dividend from the digital
switchover was mainly auctioned off to large telecommunications carriers to accommodate
the deployment of 4G mobile-phone networks3. Similar diversion of the digital switchover’s
spectral dividend is expected in other OECD countries. The situation is more complex for radio broadcasting, as only a few countries have successfully adopted and rolled out digital
platforms for radio transmissions, and even fewer have clear digital switchover plans for analogue radio broadcasting.
In sum, buffer zones between broadcasters’ bands still have to be reduced if new entrants are to be accommodated. As a result, expansion of the OTA broadcasting industry can
be expected to intensify the variety-reception trade-off in the pursuit of overall service quality. The variety-reception trade-off is thus likely to be most prominent under a deregulatory
scheme that allows free entry and exit, both features we incorporate in our theoretical model.
Spence (1976), Spence and Owen (1977), and Mankiw and Whinston (1986) have analyzed
market failure arguments against free entry, based on the role of commercial broadcasters’
business models. The market price of quality programs (variety) under free entry may fail to
induce supply if the value of programs to consumers exceed costs but advertising revenues do
not. The public good argument may favor a regulatory approach by which public providers
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"The available spectrum…constitutes a limited resource that is used intensively in Europe. In many countries the introduction of new FM services is difficult and may lead to an unacceptable degradation of existing services." (CEPT, 2010, Section
1, P. 5). "The FM spectrum is in many areas overcrowded and may be reaching saturation if the high quality of reception and
existing coverages must be retained. This results in FM services increasingly being interference-limited by design or otherwise and these higher interference levels may have to be accepted to allow the introduction of many more additional services" (ibid. P. 5).
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Hazlett & Muñoz (2009) advocate increased competition in wireless markets and stress a tension between welfare-maximizing frequency allocations and government rent-extraction policies.

3

are funded to supply program variety, although the relative value of regulation in this context
is disputed by Borenstein (1988).
More recent theoretical contributions take a more positive view of free entry in broadcasting. For instance, Berry and Waldfogel (1999) argue that free entry in the radio broadcasting market is justified as long as consumption benefits compensate welfare (revenue)
losses to incumbents stations. Cunningham and Alexander (2004) show that lower industry
concentration produces direct (improved programming choice) and indirect (lower advertising prices) welfare gains. If advertising is also modeled as a bad (a nuisance inducing consumers to switch channels), then free entry may have positive welfare effects depending on
the substitutability of programs and the relative benefits of programs and advertising
(Anderson and Coate 2005).
In view of recent trends in broadcasting spectrum deregulation (De Vany, 1998; Hazlett, 2008) and the variety-reception trade-off, our theoretical analysis examines the possibility of convergence of the number of broadcasters and the royalty per channel to a steady state
and the comparative statics of the steady state when entry and exit are motivated by economic
profit. We treat the broadcasting spectrum as a state-owned, time-invariant, scarce natural resource. As in the case of any state-owned natural resource, governments are entitled to royalties on the use of spectrum. Therefore, in addition to the direct benefits from the quality of
the service provided by the broadcasting industry, there are indirect benefits, namely, the
public goods and services financed by the states’ royalties on this natural resource. These indirect benefits and the aforesaid variety-reception trade-off form the centerpieces of our theoretical analysis.
We construct an optimal control model—a novel departure from the literature extant—in which the state’s time-varying royalties are chosen by an omniscient central planner
so as to maximize the sum of the discounted direct and indirect benefits stemming from the
use of the broadcasting spectrum. The model accounts for the fact that the number of broadcasters adjusts to the profit from broadcasting at a rate moderated by sunk costs, where profit
is assumed to rise with the quality of the industry’s service. Importantly, it also accounts for
the variety-reception tradeoff, to wit, that on the one hand, entry increases variety, heightens
4

competition and, in turn, raises service quality, while on the other, entry increases spectral
congestion and the intensified interferences lower service quality.
We show that a unique steady-state number of broadcasters and royalty per channel
exist, that the steady state is a local saddle point, and that the optimal solution converges to
the steady state along the stable manifold. In contrast to the observed consolidation and return
to concentration in the aftermath of deregulatory reforms in the United States, Italy, Germany
and Japan (Noam, 1992; Motta and Polo, 1997; Hazlet, 2005), our analysis reveals that an optimally controlled royalty per channel will lead the OTA broadcasting industry to converge to
a steady state with a larger number of broadcasters, higher quality, and a higher royalty.
What’s more, our analysis of the basic control model shows that the steady state number of
broadcasters is less than the number that maximizes the broadcasts’ quality at each point in
time. Interestingly, this implies that quality rises with the number of broadcasters in a neighborhood of the steady state. That is, in a neighborhood of the steady state, the program variety effect dominates the reception clarity effect when the number of broadcasters increases.
Our formal analysis of the OTA broadcasting industry begins by developing the dynamics of the number of broadcasters in section 2, and also includes the development of the
variety-reception trade-off. Section 3 argues that the broadcasting industry has a multifaceted
effect on consumers’ utility: a quality enhanced positive direct effect of the industry service,
a negative indirect effect of the industry service by diverting income away from other goods,
and a positive effect of the spectrum royalties paid by the industry on the provision of public
goods and services. These considerations and the OTA broadcasting industry’s dynamics are
then incorporated into the construction of the public planner’s optimal control problem. In
section 4 the necessary and sufficient conditions are derived to set the stage for the qualitative
analysis in the ensuing sections.
The unique steady-state solution of the control problem is derived in section 5 and
shown to be a local saddle point. Section 6 presents the comparative statics of the steady-state
number of OTA broadcasters, quality, and the royalty payment, and provides an economic interpretation of them. Finally, section 7 contemplates an extension of the basic optimal control
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model in which consumers’ aggregate income is dependent on the quality of the service provided by the broadcasting industry.

2. Industry dynamics
Let

denote the number of broadcasters of OTA transmitted programs (or broadcasts) at

time . At every instant

each broadcaster uses a single channel and delivers a single pro-

gram. Let the broadcasters be technologically and location-wise identical, paying royalties
to the government for using a channel (or spectrum band) at time . Also let the width
of each band be technologically determined and fixed, say

, and let the bands be

evenly spread along a fixed homogeneous spectrum space set aside for the broadcasting industry, namely

. As a result, if the number of broadcasters increases, the bands shift

and the buffer zones between them are evenly reduced. For tractability, let us further assume
that the consumers of the OTA broadcasting industry’s service are located at an identical,
physically unobstructed distance from the broadcasters, i.e., along a flat circle with the
broadcasters at its centre. Accordingly, all broadcasts are equally receivable by all consumers. We assume that the consumers of the broadcasting industry’s service are also users of
broadcast time. That is, in addition to watching and/or listening to programs, they advertise
their services during the programs. The consideration of consuming-using agents simplifies
the analysis which, more generally, could have considered the demands of three types of
agents: consumers only, users only and consumer-users.
Broadcasters enter the industry as long as profit per broadcaster
,
where

is positive, i.e.,
(1)

is the time-invariant and parametric speed of adjustment, or ease of entry and

exit, into the industry. Sunk costs, that is, the fixed costs associated with facilities, equipment
and knowledge that are not transferable to other industries, deter entry and exit. Hence the
larger the broadcasters’ sunk costs are, the lower the speed of adjustment of the number of
broadcasters to profit per broadcaster.
From the perspective of the consumers, the quality of the aerially transmitted programs, say

, rises with content variety and reception clarity. While the variety of pro6

grams is increasing in the number of channels

, interferences intensify as the number of

channels increases because the buffer zones between the channels diminish. Given that the
buffer zones are evenly reduced, reception clarity is positively related to the size of the unused spectrum

, which by definition is given by
.

(2)

Consequently, the quality of the aerially transmitted broadcasts has two opposing effects resulting from an increase in the number of broadcasters. There is a direct, or variety effect, of
the number of channels on quality, which is positive but not increasing. On the other hand,
there is an indirect, or interference effect, of the number of channels on quality by way of the
reduced separation between channels, which is negative. Furthermore, up to a critical number
of channels, say

, the positive variety effect is assumed to dominate the negative

interference effect.
Taking the above trade-off and assumptions into consideration, a functional form that
captures the content variety and reception clarity effects on the quality of the service of the
OTA broadcasting industry is

, or using Eq. (2),
.

(3)

The logistic specification captures the opposing effects of the number of broadcasters on
quality, because

as

and

. Thus the

marginal effect of the number of broadcasters on the quality of the service of the broadcasting
industry is initially positive, but when more than half of the spectrum’s carrying capacity is
used the negative interference effect dominates the positive variety effect on the quality of the
industry’s service. Note that

is nothing more than the number of broadcasters

that maximizes quality at each .
Naturally, the demand for broadcasts increases with quality. Consequently, the broadcasting industry’s total revenue

from advertisements and subscription fees (in the case

of pay TV) is a function of quality as well. For tractability, we take this function to be linear.
Letting the price of quality be unity (numéraire), it follows that
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, and upon using

Eq. (3), the industry’s total revenue may be expressed as a function of the number of broadcasters, namely
.

(4)

Assuming that consumers do not have favorite channels, the industry’s total revenue is equally distributed. For simplicity, the instantaneous operational cost of each channel is taken to be
, in which case the industry’s profit per broadcaster is

time-invariant and positive, say
given by

. Substituting this expression for

in Eq. (1) and mak-

ing use of Eq. (4), it follows that the differential equation governing the change in the number
of broadcasters over time is
.

(5)

Equation (5) shows that a once and for all increase in the royalty per channel by an industry
initially in a steady state, i.e., when

, reduces profit below zero and, subsequently,

broadcasters leave the industry. In turn, the variety of programs is reduced but the reception
of each broadcast is improved, all the while revenue per broadcaster decreases, causing more
broadcasters to leave the industry until profit is driven back to zero.

3. Consumers’ utility and public planner’s optimal control problem
The consumers are taken to have an aggregate income of

, of which

is spent on ac-

cess to, and advertisements in, OTA broadcasts. Consequently, the remainder,

, is

spent on private goods and services. The royalties paid by the broadcasters at time
en by

are giv-

, and are immediately directed to finance public goods and services.
Consumers derive instantaneous utility from the quality of the service provided by the

broadcasting industry

, expenditures on private goods and services

investment of the spectrum’s royalties in the provision of public goods
stantaneous utility function

can be written as

, and the
. Thus, the in. In order to

simplify the qualitative characterization of the ensuing optimal control problem, and to put
the public goods nature of the royalty payments front and centre, it is henceforth assumed that
the instantaneous utility function is of the quasi-linear form. That is, it is assumed that
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is

linear in the consumers’ total spending on goods and services,

, and strict-

ly increasing and strongly concave in the government’s investment of the spectrum’s royalties in the provision of public goods and services,

. Hence,
, (6)

,

where

, and

on

. Although the quality of the service provid-

ed by the broadcasting industry no longer appears in the instantaneous utility function, it is
taken into account in the optimal control problem via the adjustment of the number of broadcasters to profit per broadcaster.
In the proposed framework, the number of broadcasters is controlled through the state
equation (5) by the royalty per channel, the latter of which is set by an omniscient central
planner to maximize the consumers’ utility over an infinite horizon. The public planner’s decision problem is
(7)
,
where

,

is the planner’s time-preference rate,

, and

is the intertemporal indirect utility function. As

is exogenous, it does not influence

the solution to problem (7), thus the objective functional in Eq. (7) may be replaced by
for the purpose of deriving an optimal control.

4. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimal control of royalties
Recalling that

denotes the fixed amount of spectrum available to the broadcasting industry,

it is assumed that

for all

. That is, we assume that there exist

broadcasters of OTA transmitted programs and that they number less than the number that
would use the entire spectrum available to the industry. A necessary and sufficient condition
for the steady-state number of broadcasters and royalty per channel to be positive is
may be verified by inspection of Eqs. (16) and (17) below. Accordingly,

, as

will be subse-

quently maintained. It will be shown in section 5 that the steady-state number of broadcasters
is less than

without imposing any further assumptions on problem (7). As a result, the
9

state variable constraints

and

do not bind along an optimal solution in a

neighborhood of the steady state and thus may be safely ignored for our purposes.
The current-value Hamiltonian associated with problem (7) is defined as
(8)
where the costate variable λ is the planner’s current value shadow price of the number of
broadcasters. By Theorems 14.3 and 14.9 of Caputo (2005), an interior solution to problem
(7) must satisfy the following necessary conditions:
,

(9)
,

,

(10)
,

(11)

.

(12)

In order to derive a qualitative characterization of a solution to the decision problem postulated in Eq. (7), the necessary conditions in Eqs. (9)–(11) are reduced to a pair of ordinary differential equations in

.

To accomplish the reduction, first differentiate Eq. (9) with respect to . Then substitute Eqs. (10) and (11) in the resulting differential equation, along with
from Eq. (9), to arrive at
,

,

(13)
.

(14)

Equations (13) and (14) form the backbone of the analysis in the ensuing two sections. A solution of problem (7) must satisfy them and the transversality condition given in Eq. (12).
Let

be a solution of the necessary conditions given in Eqs. (9)–(12),

with corresponding current value costate variable
(2005),

. By Theorem 14.4 of Caputo

is a solution of problem (7) if

for every admissible time path

and if

is concave in

over an open convex set containing all admissible values of
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.

for all

Denote a steady state solution of the necessary conditions by
corresponding current value costate variable

. Then the transversality condition

holds with an equality if
as

, with

exists and if

. In order to see the veracity of this claim, note

that (i)

as
by way of the fact that

implies that
from Eq. (9), (ii)

as
, and (iii)

the fact that the limit of a product of functions equals the product of their individual limits
when each function possesses a limit. Moreover, if

as

, then the necessary transversality condition given in Eq. (12) also holds, and for basically the same reasons as just indicated.
Let us now turn to the concavity requirement on the current value Hamiltonian
. Because an interior solution and
that

have been assumed, it follows

and

. Hence, if the

determinant of the Hessian matrix of
a solution

with respect to

is positive, then

of the necessary conditions is the solution to the decision problem

(7). As is readily verified, the aforesaid determinant is positive if and only if
. Accordingly, the so-called Arrow-Pratt degree of relative risk aversion in a stochastic framework being greater than one-half is equivalent to the determinant of
the Hessian matrix of

with respect to

being positive.

Summing up, we have shown that if (i) a solution to the necessary conditions given in
Eqs. (9)–(12) exists and converges to a steady state solution of the said necessary conditions,
(ii) the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion is greater than one-half, and (iii) the
limit as the time horizon goes to infinity of the number of broadcasters exists, then there exists a unique optimal solution of the posed optimal control problem that converges to the
steady state solution of the necessary conditions. Moreover, the unique optimal solution is
fully characterized by Eqs. (13) and (14).
In the next section we show that (i) a unique steady state solution of the necessary
conditions (13) and (14) exists, (ii) a closed-form expression for
rived, and (iii) that

is a local saddle point.
11

can be de-

5. The steady state and local stability
The steady state values
when

and

are by definition the solution to Eqs. (13) and (14)

, and are therefore the solution to the system of linear equations
,

seeing as

and

. Recalling that

(15)

, the unique solution to this system is
,

(16)

.

(17)

Note that even though we have not specified the functional form of

, which is defined

over the public goods and services, we have nonetheless been able to derive a unique closedform solution for the steady state values of the number of broadcasters and the royalty per
channel. Furthermore, the implied unique steady state value of quality is by definition given
by

, or
,

(18)

upon using Eqs. (16) and (17).
At this juncture it is worthwhile to pause and examine two features of the steady state
solution. First, observe that

, a fact that may be established using a proof

by contradiction. In other words, the consumers’ lifetime utility maximizing number of
broadcasters in the steady state is less than the number that maximizes the quality of the
broadcasting industry at each point in time. Second, using Eq. (3), it then follows that
in a neighborhood of the steady state. That is, the quality of the services provided by the broadcasting industry is an increasing function of the number of broadcasters in a neighborhood of the steady state. This means that in a neighborhood of the steady
state, the program variety effect of the number of broadcasters dominates the reception clarity
effect.

12

As shown heretofore, the optimal solution of the control problem converges to the
steady state in the limit of the planning horizon. It is thus logical to determine if the steady
state can indeed be approached in the said limit, particularly from an industry with an initially
small number of broadcasters. Once convergence to the steady state is proven to be possible,
the effects of the model parameters on the steady-state solution can be investigated.
The local stability of the steady state solution

is determined by exam-

ining the Jacobian matrix of Eqs. (13) and (14) evaluated at

, namely,

. (19)

Using the fact that

from Eqs. (16) and (17), it is somewhat tedious

but straightforward to show that

.

Hence, by Theorem 13.6 of Caputo (2005), the steady state is a local saddle point. The local
phase-diagram in the

-plane surrounding the steady state can now be constructed.

By definition, and using Eq. (13), the

isocline is given by those values of

that satisfy the linear equation
ward sloping straight line in the
izontal intercept

. As a result, the

and

isocline is a down-

-phase plane with vertical intercept

and hor-

.

By the implicit function theorem, the slope of the

isocline in a neighborhood of

the steady state is
,

(20)

which may be positive or negative in general. However, it is readily shown from Eq. (19) and
the fact that

, that
.
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(21)

That is to say, the slope of the
than the slope of the

isocline in a neighborhood of the steady state is greater

isocline in a neighborhood of the steady state.

The upshot of the two preceding paragraphs is that the local phase diagram can take
either of two configurations, as depicted in Figures 1 and 2 below. Note that the vector field
in each figure follows from inspection of the signs of the elements of the Jacobian matrix in
Eq. (19).

As seen in Figure 1, the only trajectories that converge to the steady state in the limit
of the planning horizon are the pair corresponding to the stable manifold, indicated by the
thicker pair of lines. Given that the aforementioned sufficient conditions hold, the stable manifold represents the unique solution to problem (7) once an initial condition is specified, as
the values of the number of broadcasters and royalty per channel along it satisfy all the necessary conditions. It therefore follows that the optimal time-path of the number of broadcasters
and the royalty per channel are either both monotonically increasing, or monotonically de14

creasing, functions of time. In view of the fact that the optimal time-path of quality is given
by

, it follows that

because

. Hence,

, quality is either a monotonically increasing or monotonically

decreasing function of time and mimics the qualitative behavior over time of the number of
broadcasters in a neighborhood of the steady state.
For example, starting from a highly regulated industry with a relatively small number
of broadcasters, say

, the left upward sloped arm of the stable manifold is the one

that is relevant for the public planner. Along this trajectory the number of broadcasters and
quality increase over time despite the fact that the royalty per channel is increasing over time
as well. The economic explanation for this seemingly anomalous result is that given the relatively small number of initial broadcasters and quality, the initial and subsequent royalties are
relatively low, thereby allowing broadcasters to earn a positive profit. The resulting profit induces entry by other broadcasters and thus raises quality. The optimal royalty per channel set
by the public planner in this case permits the broadcasting industry to approach the steady
state along this trajectory by setting a relatively low initial royalty, followed by an ever increasing royalty.
The situation is rather different in Figure 2, which also depicts a local saddle point for
the steady state. The optimal time-paths of the number of broadcasters, quality, and the royalty per channel are monotonic functions of time, as in Figure 1, but in this case the first two
variables move in the opposite direction of the third over time, as the stable manifold is now
downward sloping. As before, consider a highly regulated industry with a relatively small
number of broadcasters so that

, so that the left downward sloped arm of the stable

manifold is the one that is relevant for the public planner. Here, the more natural case results:
namely, the optimal policy has the royalty falling over time and the number of broadcasters
and quality increasing over time. The economic explanation for this result is that in contrast
to the prior case, the small number of initial broadcasters and quality is accompanied by a
relatively high initial royalty. In which case, the planner must facilitate the broadcasters’ extraction of profits by lowering the royalty over time in order to attract additional broadcasters
into the industry and increase quality.
15

6. Comparative statics of the steady state
The effects of the model parameters on the steady-state number of broadcasters and royalty
per channel are obtained by differentiation of Eqs. (16) and (17). The steady state comparative statics for quality follow from differentiation of Eq. (18). Note, however, that because
, the steady state comparative statics for quality have the same sign as
those for the number of broadcasters and thus need not be computed.
Consider first the effect of an increase in the cost of operating a channel on the
steady-state number of broadcasters and royalty per channel, namely,
,

.

(22)

Thus as costs increase, the planner attempts to help the broadcasters by lowering the royalty.
Even so, profit declines and some broadcasters leave the industry, resulting in fewer broad-

16

casters in the new steady state along with lower quality. Moreover, royalty revenue
declines and the consumers are worse off, for by Theorem 14.10 of Caputo
(2005),
,

(23)

from Eq. (9).

and

The effect of an increase in the planner’s rate of time preference on the steady-state
number of broadcasters and royalty per broadcaster is given by
,
seeing as

,

(24)

. Therefore as the planner becomes more impatient, the steady state royalty

payment increases while the steady state number of broadcasters and quality decrease.
The effect of the speed of entry and exit to profit per broadcaster on the steady-state
number of broadcasters and royalty per broadcaster is
,

.

(25)

Hence, as broadcasters become more responsive to changes in profit per broadcaster, the
planner lowers the steady state royalty per channel. This has the effect of increasing profit per
broadcaster, which in turn draws more broadcasters into the industry and raises quality.
Whether consumers are better or worse off is not clear, however, as
.
If

, then it follows from Figures 1 and 2 that

(26)
and

for all

. Therefore, in this case, consumers are indeed better off as broadcasters become
more responsive to changes in profit per broadcaster.
Widening the channels’ spectral bands (i.e., increasing

) decreases the steady-state

number of broadcasters (and thus channels) as well as the steady-state royalty per channel, as
,
Moreover, royalty revenue

.

falls and consumers are worse off because
17

(27)

.

(28)

Therefore, widening the channels’ spectral bands is qualitatively equivalent to an increase in
the operating costs per channel.
For the final steady state comparative statics calculation, we examine the effect of an
increase in the amount of spectrum available to the broadcasting industry, that is,
,

.

(29)

In comparing Eq. (22) to Eq. (29), it is seen that the effect of an increase in operating costs
per channel on the steady state number of broadcasters, quality, and the royalty per channel,
is identical to that of a decrease in the amount of spectrum available to the broadcasting industry. Moreover,
.

(30)

so that consumers are better off if more spectrum is allocated to the broadcasting industry.

7. Extension: consumers’ income sensitivity to broadcasts’ quality
As the total effect of the quality of the broadcasting industry service on the consumers’ aggregate income is not clear, the previous sections ignored the issue. Doing so helped sharpen
the focus on the implications of the tradeoff between variety and reception for the allocation
of spectrum for broadcasting. In extending the analysis to this issue, we consider the possibility that the quality of the broadcasting industry service has two opposing effects on aggregate
income, implying that the sign of

is not clear a-priori. On the one hand,

broadcasts disseminate information that enhances knowledge, forms standards of performance and generates transactions. On the other, broadcasts divert consumers’ time from work
and active investment in human and social capitals. These opposing effects are intensified by
the quality of the broadcasts. With
of broadcasts,

indicating the information dissemination effect

the production-effort diversion effect, and

the aggregate in-

come attainable when the said effects offset one another, the consumers’ aggregate income
may be expressed as

, where
18

.

Because we incorporate the sensitivity of the consumers’ aggregate income to broadcasts’ quality into the analysis, consumers’ aggregate income appears as a determinant of the
consumers’ income directed to the consumption of private goods. We therefore relax the assumption that the marginal utilities from spending on the quality of the broadcasting industry’s service and on private goods are identical, and instead denote them by

and

, respectively. Consequently, and in consideration of Eq. (3), the consumers’ instantaneous utility function

is now of the form
(31)

Equation (31) replaces Eq. (6) when the effects of the quality of the broadcasting industry’s
service on the consumers’ aggregate income are contemplated, as in the present case.
Our interest in what follows is in deducing the effects of the preceding extension on
the local dynamics and steady state comparative statics of optimal control problem (7). The
exposition will be greatly simplified by relying on some basic results from Caputo (1997,
2005 Chapter 18) pertaining to the class of exponentially discounted, autonomous, infinite
horizon optimal control problems with one state variable and one control variable, of which
problem (7) is a special case. Note that assumptions (A.1)–(A.7) from Caputo (1997, 2005
Chapter 18) hold in the present case.
As was the case when the effects of quality on aggregate income were ignored, the
steady state is a local saddle point by Theorem 18.1 of Caputo (2005). Moreover, in a neighbourhood of the steady state, the phase diagram is qualitatively identical to Figure 1. As a result, the economic interpretation of the local dynamics that applied in the basic model applies
to the extended model and thus need not be repeated. What differs from the basic model is
that the steady state number of broadcasters may be greater than or less than the number that
. That is, it is not necessarily

maximizes quality at each point in time, i.e.,

the case that in the extended model, steady state quality rises with the number of broadcasters, in contrast to the basic model. In what follows, we focus on the steady state comparative
statics of the parameters specific to the extended version of the model, to wit
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.

By Corollary 18.2.1 of Caputo (2005), the effect of the consumers’ aggregate income
sensitivity to the quality of broadcasters on the steady-state number of broadcasters and royalty per channel is given by
,

.

(32)

Thus an increase in the effect of the broadcasting industry’s service quality on aggregate income increases the number of broadcasters and decreases the royalty per channel in the new
steady state if the old steady state number of broadcasters is less than the number that maximizes quality at each point in time. In this case the positive variety effect on the quality of the
industry’s service dominates the negative congestion effect. Regardless of which effect dominates, however, consumers are better off, as Theorem 14.10 of Caputo (2005) implies that
,
seeing as

(33)

.

An increase in the consumers’ direct instantaneous marginal utility from the quality of
broadcasts increases the number of broadcasters and decreases the royalty per channel in the
new steady state if in the old steady state the variety effect on the quality of the industry’s
service dominated the congestion effect, seeing as
,

(34)

by Corollary 18.2.1 of Caputo (2005). Consumers are unambiguously better off no matter
what signs prevail for the steady state comparative statics, because
.

(35)

Finally, the effect of an increase in the consumers’ instantaneous marginal utility from
the private goods is given by
,

. (36)

Hence, if in the old steady state the variety effect dominated the congestion effect and the difference between the information-dissemination effect and effort-diversion effect of the
20

broadcasts’ quality on the consumers’ income is larger than the quality price of broadcasts,
then an increase in the instantaneous marginal utility of consumption of private goods increases the number of broadcasters and decreases the royalty per channel in the new steady
state. Because
,

(37)

consumers are unambiguously better off, as in the two previous cases.

8. Conclusion
Spectrum is a state-owned, time-invariant, scarce natural resource. The advent of digital
transmission technologies has done little to relieve broadcasting spectrum constraints. The
perennial trade-off between content variety and reception clarity continues to prevail and is
likely to be most prominent under a deregulatory scheme. As in the case of any state-owned
natural resource, governments are entitled to charge royalties on its use and can direct these
revenues to finance public goods and services. Therefore, in addition to the direct benefits
from the service provided by the broadcasting industry, additional benefits accrue to consumers from the public goods and services financed by the royalties on this natural resource.
In order to set spectrum royalties efficiently, we developed two optimal control models that take into account the variety-reception trade-off and the entry and exit of broadcasters
in accordance with the profit per broadcaster. With the aid of phase-plane analysis, we were
able to achieve a qualitative characterization of the consumers’ lifetime utility maximizing
time-path of the royalty per channel and the number of broadcasters, including their steady
state comparative statics. In the basic model we showed that the steady state number of
broadcasters is less than the number that maximizes quality at each point in time, implying
that in a neighborhood of the steady state, quality rises with the number of broadcasters. Interestingly, and in contrast to the observed consolidation and return to concentration in the aftermath of past deregulatory reforms in OECD countries, our analysis reveals that the optimal
control of the broadcasting industry may gradually lead the industry to a steady state with a
larger number of broadcasters, higher quality, and higher royalties.
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